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THE SUPREME COURT, TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY,
AND CONTINUING PROBLEMS OF STATE
ENCROACHMENT INTO INDIAN COUNTRY
Clifford M. Lytle
One of the persistent themes that has tormented tribal govern-
ments throughout Indian history relates to the aggressive at-
tempts by state governments to extend their laws into Indian
country. With the extension of state legislation comes the
assumption of state jurisdiction over Indian affairs on reserva-
tions, and this has been of no small concern to tribal authorities.
In the early 1950s, the states played a role in successfully convinc-
ing Congress to pass Public Law 280,1 which imposed both state
civil and criminal jurisdiction onto reservations in several states.
On the whole, however, tribal governments have been able to
maintain a protective shield against this threat of encroachment.
Still, pressure from state governments has not subsided in recent
years, especially in view of the fact that Indian country holds so
much in the nature of mineral wealth. The importance of this
continuing Indian-state struggle requires careful examination.
This article will explore the role the Supreme Court has played
in providing Indian nations with protection against attempted
state intrusions into Indian country. Initially, the Court erected a
firm barrier providing tribes with almost complete immunity. In-
ternal tribal sovereignty was the justification underlying this
cloak of immunity. Although recent decisions have shown a drift
in a direction that affords tribes less protection than they would
like, analysis of the cases involved reveals that the erosion has not
been significant. What has occurred is a change in the criteria used
to determine when state encroachments are permissible and when
they are not.
Roots of Tribal Sovereignty
The turmoil that persisted between the Indian and non-Indian
communities during the embryonic days of the nation's develop-
ment demanded that some kind of action be taken to define the
status of Indian nations. Clearly this was a responsibility to be
shouldered by the federal government. Some political institution
or personality, however, had to assume the role of delineating the
relationship between the Indian nations and the fledgling
© 1980 Clifford M. Lytle
1. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1162.
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American government. The Supreme Court stepped forward to
assume the responsibility. The political personality thrust into the
limelight was Chief Justice of the Supreme Court John Marshall.
The first serious attempt by the Court to define the federal
government's relationship to Indian nations was Johnson v.
McIntosh in 1823.2 Chief Justice Marshall used his opinion in this
decision to develop a theory of Indian subservience to the federal
government. While paying lip service to the notion of continued
Indian autonomy, Marshall reasoned that conquest gave the
white man ownership and title to Indian lands. This was subject,
however, to the continued right of Indian occupancy and use.
Thus, while the Indians' interest in their lands was not completely
extinguished, it was altered significantly in that the federal
government became the owner of the soil.
Land obviously was (and continues to be) the Indians' most
precious resource. And while the right to occupancy and use is an
important interest retained by the Indians, ownership in the
hands of the federal government relegated the tribes to a depen-
dent status.
Johnson v. McIntosh created a landlord-tenant relationship
between the government and Indian tribes. The federal govern-
ment, as landlord, possessed not-only the power to terminate the
"tenancy" of its Indian occupants, but it could materially affect
the lives of the Indians through its control and regulation of land
use. With the exercise of power comes responsibility, and
Johnson constituted the first instance in which a judicially
recognized federal responsibility over Indian affairs was ar-
ticulated. Indeed, much of the power the federal government ex-
ercises over Indian affairs today emanates from the concept of
federal ownership of Indian land and its sovereignty over it. This
notion, as a matter of fact, constitutes the basis upon which the
Court in the Cherokee Nation Cases3 developed its theory of
federal guardianship over Indian affairs.
The first three decades of the nineteenth century were fragile
ones in the history of American government. The national
government was far from strong, and it was continuously faced
with recalcitrant states challenging its authority. It was during
this period of political turmoil that the Cherokee Nation Cases
2. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
3. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Johnson v. McIntosh, 21
U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
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arose. The state of Georgia was intent on removing the Creek and
Cherokee Indians out of the western portion of the state. State
authorities openly flouted the terms of federal treaties and
threatened to use force against both the Indians and American
troops if that proved necessary to accomplish the removal. While
the federal government did initiate a policy by which to move the
Indians, both the Creeks and the Cherokees were intent upon
staying in their homelands and thus the government's attempts at
evacuation went slowly. The discovery of gold on the Indians'
land made the state even more determined to expedite the exodus
of the two tribes. At one point the governor of Georgia, having
issued orders to conduct surveys in the area, threatened civil war
if the state's efforts were hindered by the federal government.
President Adams answered this with a threat of his own; he
would send in federal troops. The pending conflict was averted
when at the last minute the Creeks capitulated and moved west of
the Mississippi River.
The Cherokees were somewhat more stubborn than the Creeks.
In 1827 the Cherokee Nation adopted a written constitution and
proclaimed itself to be an "independent" state. The Georgia
legislature responded to this with a series of laws that extended
state jurisdiction over all Indian territory, annulled the Cherokee
laws, and directed the seizure of all Cherokee lands. An oppor-
tunity to demonstrate just how serious the state of Georgia was in
the matter developed in 1830. A Cherokee Indian named George
Tassel was arrested and tried for a murder that had been commit-
ted within the Cherokee territory. Normally this offense would
have fallen within the jurisdiction of the Cherokee Nation, but
the state prosecuted the case claiming that it had jurisdiction over
all Indian lands within its boundaries. Tassel was convicted, and
this was upheld by the Georgia Supreme Court as properly within
the jurisdiction of the state. The Cherokee Tribe appealed to
President Jackson to uphold the tribal treaty rights, but unlike
President Adams, Jackson refused to take action in defense of
the tribe. Tassel then appealed to the United States Supreme
Court under its original jurisdiction, asking the Supreme Court to
issue an injunction preventing the state of Georgia from extend-
ing its criminal law into Indian country in violation of the tribe's
treaty rights. The Cherokees petitioned the Supreme Court in the
capacity of an independent nation. Under Article III, section 2 of
the Constitution, foreign states are permitted to bring a cause of
action to the Supreme Court under its original jurisdiction. The
Cherokees felt that they qualified under this provision.
1980]
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In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,4 the United States Supreme
Court dismissed the Cherokee petition. The Court concluded that
an Indian tribe was neither a state nor a foreign nation within the
meaning of the Constitution, and hence, the Cherokees could not
invoke the original jurisdiction of the United States Supreme
Court. If it was true that the Indian tribe had a legal grievance to
pursue, the Supreme Court was not the appropriate forum in
which to prosecute that right. The Court simply did not have the
jurisdiction. At this point the issue could have been closed with
nothing more said. That was not the style of Chief Justice Mar-
shall, however. Marshall seized the occasion to clarify not only
the relationship of Indian tribes to the government but to spell
out a basis for the federal government's assumption of respon-
sibility over Indian affairs.
Marshall proceeded to reason that the condition of Indian peo-
ple was unlike that of any other people in existence. Using the
federally owned land theory discussed in Johnson v. McIntosh,
Marshall noted that while the Indians possessed an unques-
tionable right to occupy the land, the lands were still within a ter-
ritory to which the United States asserted a title independent of
the Indians' will. This led to Marshall's characterization of In-
dian tribes as "domestic dependent nations." Indians resided in a
state of pupilage. Their relation to the United States resembled
that of a ward to his guardian.
They look to our government for protection; rely upon its
kindness and its power; appeal to it for relief to their wants;
and address the president as their great father. They and their
country are considered by foreign nations, as well as by
ourselves, as being so completely under the sovereignty and
dominion of the United States, that any attempt to acquire
their lands, or to form a political connexion with them, would
be considered by all as an invasion of our territory, and an act
of hostility.'
Marshall's views in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia laid a founda-
tion upon which much of the idea of federal responsibility over
Indian affairs is predicated. Unfortunately, only one other
justice, MacLean, joined the Chief Justice in his opinion. Two
justices disagreed entirely with Marhsall's reasoning. While con-
cluding that Marshall was correct in rejecting jurisdiction in the
4. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
5. Id. at 16.
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case, Justices Baldwin and Johnson argued that Indian nations
possessed no sovereignty whatsoever. Justices Thompson and
Story both dissented, concluding that the Cherokees did qualify
as a state under the Constitution so as to bring a cause of action.
They defined a state as a body of men united together to procure
their mutual safety and advantage by means of their union. They
governed themselves by their own authority and laws. The fact
that a weak state, in order to provide for its safety, placed itself
under the protection of a stronger state, did not strip the former
of its sovereignty.6 Clearly the Cherokees qualified under these
circumstances.
The Court's decision in the Cherokee Nation case is perplex-
ing. The justices split three ways in their views':
Marshall-MacLean: Tribes are domestic dependent nations.
Thompson-Story: Tribes are sovereign nations.
Baldwin-Johnson: Tribes have no sovereignty.
Although the justices divided 2-2-2 in their perspectives of In-
dian sovereignty, there did emerge a clear four-justice bloc that
supported some notion of tribal sovereignty. Interestingly,
Justices Thompson and Story had not written their opinion at the
time the decision was initially announced. The critical response to
the case was so anti-Indian that Chief Justice Marshall persuaded
Thompson and Story to pen their thoughts into a separate opin-
ion so as to broaden the base of legal support for the Indian
cause. The Cherokees, of course, lost the case, but the federal
guardianship philosophy of Marshall was to prove an enduring
benefit to the Indians in the future.
Chief Justice Marshall was a consummate politician. He was
convinced that had he ruled in favor of the Indians, President
Jackson would have refused to enforce the Court's order. Mar-
shall thus avoided a confrontation with the President by con-
cluding that the Court had no jurisdiction over the case. In the
true art of Marshallian activism, the Chief Justice inserted his
"domestic dependent nation" and "guardianship" theories into
the Court's opinion. These ideas may have been nothing more
than dicta, but it was dicta that has been both persuasive and
enduring over the years.
While Marshall's ideas in the Cherokee Nation case may have
persisted for decades, they were not of great comfort to the
6. Id. at 52-53.
7. Justice Duvall did not participate in the decision.
1980]
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Cherokee Indians who lost the case. The tribe needed to seek out
another case by which to restrain the state of Georgia from
destroying the tribal government and confiscating Indian lands.
The opportunity to challenge Georgia came when the state
arrested Samuel A. Worcester in the Cherokee territory in 1831.
Worcester was one of several missionaries working on the Indian
reservation who were arrested for violating Georgia law. The law
required all non-Indian residents of the Cherokee territory to
obtain a license from the governor of the state. The missionaries
were convicted of failure to obtain a license and sentenced to four
years of hard labor. While all of the defendants were extended
pardons, Samuel Worcester and Elizur Butler refused to accept
the offer. They decided to test the constitutionality of the state
law and the United States Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.
As in the Cherokee Nation case, the state of Georgia refused to
appear.
Chief Justice Marshall used Worcester v. Georgia8 to reaffirm
his notions of Indian sovereignty that were enunciated in the first
Cherokee Nation case. Laying the foundation with a historical
overview, Marshall emphasized that the Indians had their own
political institutions and were engaged in self-government. The
British never attempted to interfere with domestic internal affairs
of the Indians. The Indians were considered to be capable of self-
government and were permitted this prerogative. The colonies
followed a similar approach in dealing with the Indians. In
analyzing the Treaty of Hopewell' between the United States and
the Cherokee Nation, Marshall concluded that the treaty expli-
citly recognized the national character of the Cherokees and their
right to self-government. There was nothing in the treaty to indi-
cate that the Cherokees were to be stripped of their national
character. "The treaties and laws of the United States [then],
contemplate the Indian territory as completely separated from
that of the states .... ",,o All intercourse with the Indians was to
be carried on exclusively by.the government of the Union.
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying
its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in
which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with
the assent of the Cherokees themselves. . . .The whole inter-
course between the United States and this nation, is, by our
8. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
9. 7 Stat. 20.
10. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 557 (1832).
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constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United
States. I
In the first Cherokee Nation case, Marshall defined the rela-
tionship between the federal government and Indian nations.
While conceding that the Indians possessed a degree of internal
sovereignty as "domestic dependent nations," they still were to
be subordinate to the overriding will of the federal government.
This power of the white man over the Indians, however, was
tempered by the fact that the federal government had to treat
Indian tribes as a "guardian" would treat his "ward."
The sovereignty of Indian nations reached full fruition in the
second case, Worcester v. Georgia. Here Marshall defined the
relationship between Indian nations and the various states.
Focusing heavily on the right of Indians to govern themselves
internally, Marshall created a shield of sovereignty by which to
protect Indian tribes from state encroachments. Indian sover-
eignty then became multifaceted. On one hand, it was a for-
midable barrier to state encroachment into its affairs; on the
other hand, it was a fragile legality capable of extinguishment if
and when the federal government felt so inclined.
Unlike Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, the Indians won their case
in Worcester. The victory, however, was more illusory than real.
The state of Georgia announced that it had no intention of com-
plying with the Court's order. Politics clouded the whole affair.
It was in response to this case that President Jackson allegedly
stated, "John Marshall has made his decision: now let him
enforce it." Jackson, indeed, took no steps to implement the
Court's opinion. For years Jackson sided with the state of
Georgia in its attempt to remove the Cherokees and he was not
about to take up the cause of the Indians now, regardless of how
embarrassing the Worcester case may have been. Ultimately,
Jackson was able to persuade the governor of Georgia to pardon
Worcester and Butler, who by this time were willing to accept it.
Political compromise averted a constitutional crisis between the
Executive and the Supreme Court.
What happened to the Cherokees? Their legal victory in Wor-
cester was short-lived. President Jackson was finally able to move
the Cherokees out of Georgia to a home in the west. Their
journey westward came to be known as the "Trail of Tears."
Even the legal victory the Indians won in Worcester was tempered
11. Id. at 560-61.
19801
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for a period of time. Mr. Justice MacLean, in a concurring opin-
ion in Worcester, raised the question as to whether there were not
some circumstances by which states could exercise power in
Indian country. Previewing a policy of assimilation, MacLean
reasoned that Indian self-government was undoubtedly con-
templated to be of a temporary nature. If and when Indians
became incapable of self-government, or their numbers were
reduced so low as to lose the power of self-government, then the
states could extend their laws into Indian country. 2 MacLean's
concurring opinion provided lower courts with an avenue by
which to continue to review cases to determine whether the
Indian tribes had lost their capacity to survive. In the long run,
however, it was Marshall's ideas and not those of MacLean that
prevailed.
The Erosion of Tribal Sovereignty:
The Rise of Federal Preemption
Over the years the "domestic dependent" Indian nations under
the shield of tribal sovereignty became exempt from state taxa-
tion,' 3 political regulation," and administrative intrusion,' 5 to
name but a few areas of concern. The Supreme Court thus ini-
tially erected a protective barrier insulating Indian nations from
hostile state governments.
The difficulties confronting Indian-state relations, however,
have grown, not evaporated, with time. Tribal fears of state
intrusion have been real and not merely figments of the Indian
imagination. The quest for Indian land, the lack of understand-
ing by both whites and Indians of one another's cultural dif-
ferences, jealousies over Indian exemptions from state laivs and
regulations, racial discrimination, economic competition-all
contributed to a troubled relationship between the reservations
and white settlements.
Recent history has witnessed a drift away from the protective
shield the Marshall Court bestowed upon tribal governments. The
initial erosion of the doctrine of internal sovereignty appeared in
1958 in an important decision, Williams v. Lee." A superior
12. Id. at 593.
13. The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall) 737 (1866).
14. Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 248 N.W.2d 722 (1976).
15. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation v. Washington, 412 F. Supp. 651
(E.D. Wash. 1976).
16. 358 U.S. 217 (1958).
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court in the state of Arizona attempted to exercise civil jurisdic-
tion over a case in which a non-Indian sought to collect an over-
due debt for goods he had sold to an Indian couple on the Nava-
jo Reservation. Since the Navajo tribe had its own tribal court
system in operation, the Supreme Court held that the state of
Arizona could not extend its jurisdiction onto the Indian reserva-
tion. "There can be no doubt," the Court reasoned, "that to
allow the exercise of state jurisdiction here would undermine the
authority of the tribal courts over Reservations' affairs and hence
would infringe on the right of the Indians to govern themselves." I7
The key question here is whether in the absence of congressional
legislation, the state intrusion would infringe upon the right of the
tribe to govern itself (self-government). If it does, the protective
shield remains in place. But if it does not, it may be permissible for
the state to extend its laws onto the reservation.
Williams v. Lee was a departure from the Worcester decision;
under the Worcester decision, the protective buffer was high and
almost impregnable. Under Williams, however, if the state intru-
sion did not infringe upon tribal self-government, the state might
be able to extend its jurisdiction onto the reservation. A few years
later the Supreme Court formally conceded that its approach to
tribal sovereignty was changing. Justice Frankfurter announced
that the general notion of John Marshall in Worcester that state
law cannot extend onto the reservation had yielded under closer
analysis. 8
In 1973 the Court went a step farther in its erosion of tribal
sovereignty. In McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Commission,'9
Arizona attempted to apply its state income tax to the wages of a
Navajo Indian whose entire income was derived from within the
Navajo Reservation. In resolving this issue in favor of the Indian
complainant, the Supreme Court indicated that there was a clear
trend away from the idea of Indian sovereignty. The concept of
sovereignty was to be used only as a "backdrop" against which
applicable treaties and statutes must be read."0 The Court then
proceeded to talk in terms of "federal preemption." The question
was not so much one of tribal sovereignty but whether the treaties,
statutes, and tribal laws had given rise to a "preemption" of the
field so as to preclude state intrusions into Indian country. Today
17. Id. at 223.
18. Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 72 (1962).
19. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
20. Id. at 172.
19801
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the past doctrine of internal tribal sovereignty has been relegated
to a subordinate position to a more flexible criteria-federal
preemption of Indian affairs. The preemption is determined by
the Court's examination of past treaties, statutes, and tribal laws.
As a backdrop, Indian sovereignty assumes a role, but only in
helping to measure the meaning of these treaties and statutes.
There is little doubt that McClanahan and its principle of
federal preemption have displaced Worcester as the primary con-
sideration in determining when states may extend their laws onto
the reservation. As important as McClanahan is, however, the
opinion fails to bring much understanding to just how tribal
sovereignty as a backdrop of analysis should be used. Clearly, the
Court was not about to abandon the concept of sovereignty com-
pletely. But did the justices mean to place the doctrine on a back
shelf in hopes that it would be lost in the dust of time?
In 1980 the Court provided an answer to this question. The
state of Arizona had applied a motor carrier license tax and a use
fuel tax on the operations of a non-Indian logging company that
had contracted with the White Mountain Apaches to sell, load,
and transport timber on the White Mountain Apache Reserva-
tion. The Indian tribe and the timber company joined forces in
an attempt to have the taxes declared invalid. When the issue
reached the Supreme Court in White Mountain Apache Tribe v.
Bracker,2' the Court held the taxes to be inapplicable to the reser-
vation activity on the ground that the federal government, having
undertaken a comprehensive regulation of the harvesting and sale
of tribal timber, had preempted the field. This precluded the state
of Arizona from imposing its taxes on the reservation.
The White Mountain Apache Tribe case is extremely important
in view of Justice Thurgood Marshall's discussion of the tests to
be used in such disputes and the role of tribal sovereignty in mak-
ing these determinations. Marshall reasons that the "semi-
independent position" of Indian tribes has given rise to two inde-
pendent but related barriers to the assertion of state authority
over tribal reservations. The first of these is that the federal
government may have preempted the field.22 The second barrier is
that state encroachment may unlawfully infringe on the right of
tribal self-government.23 Either of these barriers standing alone
may be sufficient to invalidate the state intrusions. If there was
21. 100 S.Ct. 2578 (1980).
22. McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
23. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1958).
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any doubt as to how the Court was going to approach these prob-
lems prior to the White Mountain Apache Tribe case, it is clearly
resolved by this decision.
In addition to delineating the role of the McClanahan and
Williams doctrines, Justice Marshall proceeds to elaborate fur-
ther on the concept of tribal sovereignty. "[T]raditional notions
of Indian self-government are so deeply engrained in our juris-
prudence," Marshall reasons, "that they have provided an
important backdrop . . . against which vague or ambiguous
federal enactments must always be measured." 2 It is not helpful
in cases involving American Indians to use the general laws of
federal preemption that have emerged in other non-Indian areas
of the law. The tradition of Indian sovereignty "must inform the
determination whether the exercise of state authority has been
preempted by operation of federal law."' 25 What Marshall is say-
ing here is that tribal sovereignty as a backdrop for interpreting
statutes assumes a meaningful role in judicial decision making.
Indian sovereignty is not to be relegated to a pleasant doctrine
slowly vanishing into antiquity. The backdrop requirement
demands that treaties and federal statutes be interpreted
"generously in order to comport with these traditional notions of
sovereignty and with the federal policy of encouraging tribal inde-
pendence." 2 6 Under such an interpretation, federal preemption is
more easily attained in the area of "Indian affairs than in other
areas of the law.
As the law stands today, then, a court determining the validity
of an attempt by a state to extend its jurisdiction into Indian
country must first examine the relevant treaties and statutes
against a meaningful backdrop of tribal sovereignty to determine
if federal preemption has occurred. If it has, then the states are
foreclosed from intruding. If the court finds that federal preemp-
tion has not taken place, then the court turns to the Williams test
to see if the state laws or activity conflict with tribal self-
government. If they do, then the state intrusion again is invali-
dated. Only if there is no conflict can a state extend its civil laws
and resultant assumption of jurisdiction onto the reservation.
The Impact on Indian Country
Until now the Supreme Court has permitted state incursions in-
24. White Mt. Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 100 S.Ct. 2578 (1980).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 2584.
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to Indian country in only two instances. Both cases, interestingly,
deal with state attempts to extend their tax laws to cover the sale
of cigarettes in Indian territory. In 1976 the Supreme Court in
Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes" held that the
state of Montana could validly require Indian sellers on the reser-
vation to collect a cigarette tax from non-Indian consumers. This
was thought to be but a minimal burden on the Indian seller and
as a minimal burden, it hardly interfered with tribal self-
government. The tax, however, was only valid as collected from
non-Indian consumers. The state could not extend its taxing
power to Indian consumers for this would conflict with federal
statutes that had preempted the field and thus has been barred by
McClanahan.
In 1980 the Supreme Court was faced with a similar situation.
The state of Washington had imposed a tax on cigarettes sold by
Colville Indians to both non-Indians and Indians who were not
members of the Colville Tribe. Since the cigarette sales took place
on the reservation, this was viewed as another attempt by a state
to extend its laws into Indian country. The Supreme Court
resolved the issue in a manner similar to the way in which it
handled the Moe decision. The Court upheld the validity of the
state tax on both the white purchasers and the nontribal
Indians.2" Unfortunately, Mr. Justice White, who delivered the
opinion, does not spell out concisely the tests to be used in
deciding issues such as these.
A careful reading of the opinion, however, reveals that both
the McClanahan test and the Williams doctrine are used. White
notes that: "The federal statutes cited to us, even when given the
broadest reading to which they are fairly susceptible, cannot be
said to preempt Washington's sales and cigarette taxes." ' 9 This
clearly is an application of the McClanahan preemption test.
Later in the opinion the Justice also alludes to the Williams doc-
trine: "Washington does not infringe the right of reservation
Indians to 'make their own laws and be ruled by them'..
The Court in the Colville case thus permitted the state of
Washington to extend its civil law onto the reservation. It is
important to note, though, that the extension of state jurisdiction
27. 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
28. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation, 100 S.Ct. 2069
(1980).
29. Id. at 2082.
30. Id. at 2083.
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is extremely limited. The thrust of the statute was designed to
reach (1) non-Indians, and (2) Indians who were not members of
the Colville Tribe. Indeed, the only burden that the Colville Tribe
had to assume was in the collection of the state tax and this was
felt to be a minimal imposition on the tribe. While the Colville
traders did argue that they were being denied a competitive
marketing advantage by having to collect the state tax from non-
tribal consumers, the Court refused to accept this argument. The
denial of an artificial competitive market advantage was viewed
as not contravening the right of reservation Indians to make their
own laws and to be ruled by them.
While Indian tribes will view the Colville case as important in
that it permits the incursion of a state taxing law into Indian
country, upon reflection they might conclude that the infringe-
ment is one of little significance. Since the objective of the state
law pertains to non-Indians and nontribal members, the sanctity
of the reservation is preserved. The only blow the reservation
receives is in the loss of its competitive market advantage.
There is no doubt that the flow of Supreme Court decisions
has been away from the firm stance of immunity afforded the
Indian tribes by Worcester v. Georgia. The trend of decisions,
however, may be a reflection of the changing relationship
between Indian reservations and white communities. Tribes are
not becoming more isolated from white society; rather, their acti-
vities are becoming more interconnected with it. As the contact
between Indians and whites increases, particularly in the
economic field where competition may be present, the more states
are going to attempt to extend their laws and jurisdiction into the
affairs of the reservations. The decisions of the Supreme Court
are a mirror of these changing conditions. In responding to the
intricacies of this closer Indian-state contact, there is every indi-
cation that the Court will continue to preserve the sanctity of
Indian affairs on the reservation from state encroachment in
most respects.
1980]
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